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Constitutionalism as Mindset:
Reflections on Kantian Themes About
International Law and Globalization
Martti Koskenniemi*
Globalization is a topic of some anxiety among international lawyers.
On the one hand, its fluid dynamics — fragmentation, deformalization
and empire — undermine traditional diplomatic rules and institutions.
On the other hand, the effort to reimagine international law in
purely managerial terms appears intellectually shallow and politically
objectionable. To avoid marginalization and instrumentalization, many
lawyers have begun to think about international problems through
a constitutional vocabulary and have often cited Kant in that
connection. This Article argues that, while it is always possible to
grasp the world through a constitutional vocabulary, this does not
provide determinate answers to international problems. Instead of an
institutional architecture or a set of legal rules, constitutionalism is
best seen as a mindset — a tradition and a sensibility about how
to act in a political world. Contrary to a widespread assumption,
Kant’s political writings may also be read in this fashion and, if so,
a meaningful international transformation might necessitate not only
legislative or institutional intervention but a professional and perhaps
spiritual regeneration.
I.
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant notes that rules do not spell out
the conditions of their own application. Every rule needs, for its application,
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an auctoritatis interpositio that determines what the rule should mean in a
particular case and whether, all things considered, applying the rule might
be better than resorting to the exception. In Kant’s vivid language:
A physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head
many admirable pathological, juridical or political rules, in a degree
that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science,
and yet in the application of these rules he may very possibly blunder
— either because he is wanting in natural judgment (though not in
understanding), and whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto,
cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto ought to rank
under the former; or because his faculty of judgment has not been
sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice.1
In view of this, what is the meaning of the rule of law? And especially of the
rule of law beyond the legal system of the state? For Kant, the transition from
the state of nature to a condition of lawfulness (right) was a moral obligation
because it summed up the "conditions under which the choice of one can
be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law
of freedom."2 Yet, even in what Kant termed "republics," freedom remained
precarious as long as the threat of international war loomed in the background.
Nations, therefore, had an analogous obligation to relinquish the "lawless
freedom" of the state of nature that marked the relationship between them,
renounce war, and join in a federation of free republics that might set a world
federation as their objective.3 Although Kant’s formulation of the federal
objective in his different writings varied, he consistently pointed out that only
an international condition of (public) right (or of lawfulness) was morally
acceptable, because this was the only option able to bring about the condition
1 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 140-41 (Vasilis Politis ed., Everyman’s
1991) (1781) (A132-34). The exercise of judgment, Kant notes, requires "mother
wit," for which there are no rules and "the want of which no schooling can
compensate." Although Kant says here in a footnote, id. at 140 n.1, "[d]eficiency
in judgment is properly that which is called stupidity," in his later writings, and
especially in the Third Critique, his assessment is less harsh.
2 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 230 (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (6:230).
3 IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 50-51 (Hans Reiss ed., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter KANT,
Universal History]; IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at 93, 102-05 [hereinafter KANT, Perpetual Peace];
KANT, supra note 2, at 119-22 (6:350-53).
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of freedom that, as he once noted, was "the inner value of the world"4 and the
final end of creation.5
If the rules of law do not spell out the conditions of their application,
however, then their moral virtue (or their political point) cannot rest on
the formulations of positive laws or on what they purport to achieve in
practice, and any moral, i.e. freedom-enhancing quality, will simply depend
on their character as legal rules, on the legal proprium. The merit of law
would then not be that it contains, as it were, the contours of the ideal
social relationships suitable for each context and period. These will always
be left to the normative imagination of the auctoritatis interpositio, whose
judgment in the application of the law becomes the visible, public law face
of freedom.
The project of fidelity to the "rule of law," then, cannot be reduced to
fidelity to the purported meaning of particular laws or to the objectives
projected on them. What laws mean and the objectives they may appear to
have will depend on the judgment of the law-applier. And that judgment,
the act of competent creation of an individual norm is, as Kelsen would
say, a political act. After all, "there is no criterion on the basis of which
one of the possibilities given within the frame of the norm to be applied
could be favoured over the other possibilities."6 If for Kant (and for Kelsen)
the transition from the realm of nature (or from raw desire and violence) to
the realm of freedom in a "kingdom of ends" takes place through law, this
transition depends less on the inner force of (external) legislation than on
the moral rectitude of those whose task is to apply it. As is well known,
Kant’s view of law is embedded in his philosophy of history. Progress toward
increasing freedom becomes possible only if the experiences of the complex,
obstacle-laden learning process that is history are integrated into the practice
of judgment. In this perception, jurists rather than positive rules become law’s
nucleus, as educators and enlighteners, a conclusion that Savigny, soon after
Kant, drew from the historicity of law.7
What is the implication of this perception for the moral (political) ideal of
4 Immanuel Kant, Lectures (1780), cited in PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW
AND HAPPINESS 129 (2000).
5 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT § 84, at 302-03 (Paul
Guyer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1790) (5:435-36).
6 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 81 (Bonnie L.
Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon 1992) (1934).
7 This image of jurists is very different from Kant’s, who held that jurists should
know the codes rather than discuss their justification, a task Kant reserved for
philosophers. See IMMANUEL KANT, Der Strait der Fakulta¨ten, in RECHTSLEHRE.
SCHRIFTEN ZUR RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 371 (1988) (24-25); and see comments, e.g.,
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the rule of law? First, it suggests that the rule of law cannot mean "legalism"
in the form of fidelity to any particular meaning of the law as text or practice.
Second, it cannot mean "instrumentalism" either, defined as the systemic
effort to look beyond legal rules to their assumed objectives. Instead, I will
argue that the rule of law in this Kantian image relates to the way the law-
applier (administrator, public official, lawyer) approaches the task of judging
within the narrow space between fixed textual understandings (positivism)
on the one hand, and predetermined functional objectives (naturalism) on
the other, without endorsing the proposition that the decisions emerge from
a "legal nothing" (decisionism). I think about this in terms of the spirit, or
better, the mindset, of the legal profession.
II.
International law has never been a sociologically thick aspect of the
international world. Since its inception, however, international law has
been embedded in the optimistic trajectory sketched by Kant in his 1784
essay on The Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.8
Whatever doubts one may harbour against the natural teleology animating
this essay (and the Critique of the Power of Judgment of 17909), this idea
continues to inform much of the political project behind international law.10
After the end of the Cold War, this project seemed to gain new force.
New aspects of international relations began to be addressed through legal
rules and institutions: global trade was legalized within the World Trade
Organization (WTO, established 1995), mass atrocities and violations were
addressed by international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal
Court (ICC, established 1998). Tribunals were set for the law of the sea
and for conciliation within the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe. The workload of human rights treaty bodies and regional courts
exploded. Transnational commercial arbitration increased. Everyone was
speaking about the "rule of law" in the international field and about the
"constitutionalization" of international relations or some aspect of them.11
FRANCOIS TERRE, Le positivisme juridique et Kant, in 2 PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE
159, 160-61, 166 (1992).
8 KANT, Universal History, supra note 3.
9 KANT, supra note 5.
10 See Martti Koskenniemi, On the Idea and Practice of Universal History with a
Cosmopolitan Purpose, in 200 YEARS OF KANT (Heiko Sievers ed., forthcoming
2006).
11 For the debate among lawyers, see, for example, Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism
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By the turn of the millennium, three phenomena appeared to overshadow
these developments: "deformalization," "fragmentation" and "empire."12 By
deformalization I mean the process whereby the law retreats solely to the
provision of procedures or broadly formulated directives to experts and
decision-makers for the purpose of administering international problems
by means of functionally effective solutions and "balancing interests."
By fragmentation? I mean the splitting of law into functionally defined
"regimes" such as "trade law," "human rights law," "criminal law,"
"environmental law," "law of the sea," even "sports law," each geared
to further particular types of interests and managed by narrowly defined
expert competence. By empire I mean the emergence of patterns of constraint
deliberately intended to advance the objectives of a single dominant actor,
either through the law or irrespective of it.
The phenomena of deformalization, fragmentation, and empire emerge
from the sense that traditional diplomats’ law is failing to manage the
problems of a globalizing world due to its excessive formality and rigidity
and its failure to "adapt" to new regulatory needs. A shift is thus required
from formal rules and institutions to the objectives or values "behind" them,
far more real and important than their external manifestations. Do not remain
enchanted by the legal form, critics say. Look behind rules and institutions.
Assess costs and benefits. Streamline, balance, optimize, calculate.13
The takeover by the managerial mindset is reflected in the transformation
of the vocabularies of power. The language of law is replaced by an
idiolect of transnational regimes that enforce the most varied kinds of
guidelines, directives, de facto standards, and expectations, so as to guarantee
Lite?, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 31 (2004). One of the political theorists advocating
world constitutionalism is Ju¨rgen Habermas. See JU¨ RGEN HABERMAS, Hat die
Konstitutionalisierung des Vo¨lkerrechts noch eine Chance, in DIE GESPALTENE
WESTEN 113 (2004). For a representative collection of writings on international
constitutionalism, see TOWARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL
ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (Ronald St. John Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 2005).
12 See also Martti Koskenniemi, Global Governance and Public International Law,
37 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 241, 243-44 (2004).
13 The literature on the effects of globalization on law is too wide to be adequately
reflected here. A useful collection of essays on specific aspects of these changes,
however, is ERIC LOQUIN & CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, LA MONDIALISATION DU DROIT
(2000). For a representative set of (American) essays on the various transformations,
see THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Paul Schiff Berman ed., 2005).
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optimal effects.14 Formal rules yield to the amorphous "regulation" emerging
from a heterogeneous variety of sources and actors.15 "Government" becomes
"governance," and the language of legal "responsibility" is transformed into
assessments of "compliance."16 "Disputes" become "management problems,"
and the question of lawfulness is replaced by that of "legitimacy," uncertainly
situated between legal formality and political justice but reducible to neither
and existing mainly as a feeling of legitimacy, a warm sense of contentment
looking for no further justification.17
With new languages come the new experts who speak them. The
managerial jargon of "legitimate governance" sets up an ersatz normativity
that replaces the conservatism of law and the radical arbitrariness of justice,
highlighting the instrumental role of law and public institutions in fulfilling
desired objectives and the testing of authoritative decisions by reference
to what target populations might "accept." The result is the imposition of
empirical political science, thoroughly instrumental and committed, as a
world tribunal assisting whoever is in charge.
In a book published in 2005 by Jack Goldsmith, professor at Harvard Law
School, author of a memorandum on the transfer of prisoners to locations
where they can be tortured submitted to the office of the U.S. Attorney
General, and Eric Posner from the University of Chicago Law School, the
authors argue that the traditional defence of international law, according to
which most states abide by most international law rules most of the time, is
characteristic of a lawyers’ perverse habit of describing actual behavior as
law. This claim, however, fails to explain why states do behave as they do.
If, as these authors argue, behavior is caused and should be explained by
reference to a "coincidence of interest and coercion," then the mention of
"law" is an irrelevant decoration on what is merely a behavioral regularity.18
For these and other analysts, laws and treaties are bargains between
14 See, e.g., REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1995).
15 See, e.g., JOSE´ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
(2005); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002).
16 See, e.g., LEGALIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001); LAW
AND GOVERNANCE IN POSTNATIONAL EUROPE: COMPLIANCE BEYOND THE NATION-
STATE (Michael Zu¨rn & Christian Joerges eds., 2005).
17 On this, see also Martti Koskenniemi, Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes
Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism, 7 ASSOCIATIONS 349,
349-74 (2003).
18 JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43
(2005).
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rational egoists seeking to resolve co-ordination or co-operation problems so
as to minimize transaction costs.19 Compliance does not follow from "binding
force." This is a metaphysical abstraction. Instead, it comes about "because
[States] fear retaliation from the other state or some kind of reputational loss,
or because they fear a failure of coordination."20 For example, the provisions
on the use of force in the U.N. Charter constitute a bargain states once made
to receive protection. That bargain is now undermined because weapons of
mass destruction have come into the possession of terrorists. For states as
rational egoists, therefore, the "costs of strict adherence to the U.N. Charter
in a world of new security threats" have just become too great,21 as pointed
out by John Yoo, author of another torture memorandum submitted to the
U.S. Government. Goldsmith and Posner note: "[W]e have explained the
logic of treaties without reference to the notions of ‘legality’ or pacta sunt
servanda or related concepts,"22 and they conclude with relish: "There is a
more sophisticated international law literature in the international relations
subfield of political science."23
III.
This critique of law and international institutions has real bite. Indeed, it is
often obscure to lawyers what makes states act as they do. As instruments
for advancing preferences, customary international law or the institutions
of the diplomatic system, including the multilateral treaty or the arbitral
tribunal, are scarcely models of effectiveness. But should that be the main
perspective for assessing them?
The idea of law as a "bargain" between rational egoists looking for
"compliance" relies on a wholly dogmatic notion of agency (actor as
"egoist") with determinate and definable "objectives" and "interests," and
on a specific view about the meaning of the social facts to which this notion
should be applied. This is not the place to engage in a detailed critique of
the normative import of empirical social science, well known since Kant’s
first formulations of it against the mechanistic empiricism of early modern
19 Id. at 84-85.
20 Id. at 90.
21 John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less than Bargained for: The Use of Force and the
Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 379, 384 (2005).
22 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 18, at 90.
23 Id. at 15.
16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 8:9
natural law (especially in Hobbes and Pufendorf).24 My analysis here is
confined to the extent of the similarities between the difficulties confronting
the managerial mindset and those faced by its nemesis, legal formalism, in
four aspects of its argument.
First, its notion of "interest" or "objective," which presumes homogenous
actors with full knowledge of their environment and a stability of
preferences analogous to the legalist "will" theory of contract and legislation,
totters between a psychological view blind to the social conditioning of
interest-formation and a naturalistic (and authoritarian) theory of "objective
interests." Second, the translation of ("raw") interests or objectives into
policy preferences is just as indeterminate as the translation of "will"
into "rules" in formalist legislation. The only difference hinges on how to
understand the translation: political decision or expert calculation? Third, the
application of "policy" to individual instances of practice is hardly different
from rule- application. Like rules, policies come with exceptions and counter-
policies and are applied in "contexts" that can be described in any number
of ways. The interesting question, then, is no longer "what policy" but quis
judicabit? And fourth, the search for "compliance" assumes full knowledge
of what there is to comply with, namely, of the "behavioral standard" (i.e.
"rule"). But as every lawyer knows, this is where the problems start.25 All
will claim they are complying — perhaps in an unorthodox way, applying the
exception instead of the rule or the counter-principle for the principle — and
will challenge anyone’s power to even suggest otherwise. Paradoxically, the
managerial mindset assumes the absolute determinacy of the directives it uses
to attain regime-objectives, which must be not only semantically determinate
but must also form a stable and harmonious whole, immediately translatable
into policy for future cases. This is more than formalism, it is a caricature of
nineteenth century Begriffsjurisprudenz.
The same rejoinder is valid for the retort that management is not formalism
but balancing and costs- and-benefits calculation. What items go into the
24 The normative nature of empirical social sciences is a classic topic of debate and
listing the arguments here yet again is slightly embarrassing. For those who have
not yet had their determinacy crisis, a good place to prepare for it might be, for
instance, THE POSITIVIST DISPUTE IN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY (Theodor W. Adorno et
al. eds., 1977).
25 This is also pointed out in Michael Zu¨rn, Law and Compliance at Different Levels,
in LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN POSTNATIONAL EUROPE: COMPLIANCE BEYOND THE
NATION-STATE, supra note 16, at 1, 8-9. See also Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept
of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19
MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998).
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"balance"? Will the preferences of those not present be included, and how
will they all be "weighed" against one another? When do the "costs of strict
adherence" really become too great, and for whom? The problem is not
that such questions cannot be answered. Of course they can. But when they
are answered from within a managerial mindset, a structural bias emerges,
a consistent bias for the best values of the relevant expertise: when in
doubt, decide in favor of, for example, "free trade," "clean environment,"
"financial strictness," "preventing over curing," "safe over sorry," "security
over chance" (but also "right over security" in rights-regimes), and so forth.26
In other words, when the managerial mindset in its formalistic mode
imagines itself as law, it becomes a particularly unreflective version of legal
literalism. When thoroughly managerialized, it turns into rule by the experts
managing those practices, that is, into unreflective support of the structural
bias within a particular expert discourse. Ancien re´gimes, after all, were also
regimes, and the rule of law was imagined by Kant and other liberals against
all that.
Contrary to the managerial mindset, a Kantian perspective does not see
the law as an instrument for explaining behavior or advancing preferences.
Kant’s critique of early modern natural law as it had been articulated by
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, targeted the reduction of law into a system
for calculating happiness and constraint on the basis of an empirically
defined "human nature" so as to produce an optimally robust social order.27
As I have argued elsewhere, the idea of global law as a system of coordination
between functional regimes creates a de-territorialized equivalent of Carl
Schmitt’s ius publicum Europaeum, a naturalized division of the world into
de facto powerful orders hierarchically organized so as to guarantee maximal
effect.28 For the managerial mindset, globalization means imagining the world
26 These are, I suppose, what Duncan Kennedy dubs the ideological stakes
or adjudication. Of course, Kennedy’s analysis of the simultaneously policy-
oriented and formalistic nature of (liberal) adjudication and adjudication theory
is equally applicable in the above analysis. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE
OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIE` CLE) 39-70 (1997) (ideological stakes); id. at 97-
119 (policy argument). On structural bias, see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 600-15
(reissue with a new Epilogue, 2005).
27 KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 103. For Kant’s critique of early modern
natural lawyers, see SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE, CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON JURIDIQUE
124-35 (2004).
28 Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple
Modes of Thought, Keynote Speech, Harvard University (Mar. 5, 2005),
available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/PluralismHarvard.pdf. See also
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of regimesas themodernizedequivalentof seventeenthandeighteenthcentury
absolutist Europe.
IV.
International lawyers have tried to respond to deformalization,
fragmentation, and empire by resorting to a vocabulary of institutional
hierarchies and fundamental values. In practice, this device has often seemed
little more than an effort to imagine public diplomacy and the institutions of
the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations in the image
of the (European) nation-state. As an architectural project, constitutionalism,
just like the rule of law, is compatible with many kinds of politics and it
is far from clear who might currently stand to benefit from a return to
traditional multilateralism. Deformalization and fragmentation respond to
problems inherent in uniform rules and single hierarchies and cannot be
wished away. In an important sense, "empire" is also a constitutionalist
project, a counterweight to deformalization and fragmentation, and the
practical question seems to boil down to whose constitution one might have
reason to prefer, the American or the European.29
But constitutionalism is not necessarily tied to any definite institutional
project, European or otherwise. Irrespective of the functional needs or
interests that laws may seek to advance, a Kantian view would focus
on the practice of professional judgment in applying them. Less than
an architectural project, constitutionalism would then be a programme of
moral and political regeneration. This is what I mean by the description of
constitutionalism as a "mindset."
To illustrate the constitutional mindset at work, let me refer to the
2002 request of the U.N. General Assembly from the International Law
Commission, a subsidiary body of 34 public international law "generalists":
to conduct a study on "fragmentation," i.e., the breakdown of the substance
of general international law into allegedly autonomous, functionally
oriented, "self-contained" regimes. How independent had these become?
Had globalization, and in particular the proliferation of international law-
Martti Koskenniemi, The Empire(s) on International law: System Change and Legal
Transformation, 8 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 61, 61-68 (2003).
29 I have elaborated this more in Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and
Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197, 197-218
(2004).
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applying agencies, created a "risk" of fragmentation, namely, overlapping
judgments, forum-shopping, normative conflict, and "constitutional crisis"?
The Commission set up a Study Group to examine these concerns.30
Although its mandate covers "deformalization" only by default (namely,
insofar as it leads to the emergence of pockets of "special law") and does
not include "empire" (although empire being "empire" can never disappear
altogether), its conclusions, to be presented in the summer of 2006, will
still be relevant to both. These conclusions are more important for the
kind of perspective they bring into the debates than for their practical
recommendations.
The Group has found that international practice has never treated
specialized rule-systems as independent from the rest of the law. Somehow,
the very idea of international law has implied a systemic view of the
materials: the application of any one rule presumes the presence of principles
about how to determine the rule’s validity, whom it binds, how to interpret
it, and what consequences might follow from its breach. You could not just
take one bit and leave the rest aside: il n’y pas de hors-droit. Or, in the
words of a claims commission requested in 1928 to apply a treaty in the
absence of any indication on how this should be done:
Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to
general principles of international law for all the questions that it does
not itself resolve in express terms and in a different way.31
This seems almost self-evident. No lawyer will refuse to find states as
states, or ask for evidence for the rule of audiatur et altera pars merely
because the immediately applicable law is silent about such matters. These
are structurally given, not positively enacted or incorporated. In its very
first case, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
observed that WTO agreements "should not be read in clinical isolation from
public international law," and later specified that "[c]ustomary international
law applies generally to the agreements between WTO members."32
A legal regime such as the European or Inter-American Human Rights
Convention makes constant reference to general international law without
30 For the work of the Study Group so far, see International Law Commission, Report
on the Work of Its Fifty-Seventh Session, ch. XI, U.N. Doc. A/60/10 (Aug. 5, 2005).
31 Georges Pinson Case (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 327, 422 (1928).
32 Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards of Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 16 WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, Korea —
Measures Affecting Government Procurement, " 7.96, WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000).
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any act of incorporation.33 The International Criminal Tribunals on the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda repeatedly apply law that originates beyond their
constituent instruments. Even when the law appeared to step aside so as to
leave room for expediency, as was arguably true when the International Court
of Justice affirmed in the 1992 Lockerbie case that Security Council decisions
override the rights of states under particular treaties, it did so as an inference
from Article 103 of the U.N. Charter.34 The intense inter-war debates about
the limits of international law were perfectly capable of accommodating the
view that, whatever those limits were, they were set and policed by law.35
We may sometimes catch a glimpse of the legal proprium in a negative
light. The trade experts negotiating the 1995 WTO treaties were so wary
of importing law into the application of what was to be a fully functional
trade regime that they tried to erase any suggestion of a legal system
from the relevant (legal!) instruments by establishing only a "body," with
"members" issuing "reports" that were to be "adopted" by the states parties.36
Remarkably, however, the Appellate Body (AB) is today treated as a "court"
and its members as "judges," and its reports are read at government offices
and universities as "judgments" whose "binding force" is hardly undermined
by the (remote) possibility that WTO members might unanimously decide to
set them aside. But a tension persists between "lawyers" and "trade experts,"
focusing on the extent of the independence asserted by the AB: to what extent
does it follow functionally "proper" free trade principles?37
Law has a centripetal pull, the ILC study will suggest. Legal words cannot
be separated from the language in which they lead their life. They operate
only in the context of other legal words and of a professional grammar
33 See, e.g., Luzius Caflisch & Antonio Cancado Trindade, La convention ame´ricain
et europe´enne de droit des l’homme et le droit international ge´ne´ral, 108 R.G.D.I.P.
5, 5-62 (2004).
34 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.),
1992 I.C.J. 3, 15 (paras. 39-40, discussing U.N. Charter art. 103).
35 See in this regard especially HANS MORGENTHAU, DIE INTERNATIONALE
RECHTSPFLEGE, IHR WESEN UND IHRE GRENZEN (1929) and HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
36 For the view that trade rules simply are not "binding" as traditional international
law, see Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is
More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416, 416-18 (1996).
37 See Joseph Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute
Settlement (Harvard Jean Monnet, Working Paper No. 9/00, 2000), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/000901.html.
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about how they are used in relation to each other. The message will be that
there is really nothing novel in fragmentation. The international context,
perhaps like "modernity" tout court, was always "fragmented." Through
recourse to various well known professional techniques, conflicts between
rules emanating from different regimes may be resolved, formal rules
"deformalized" so as to adapt them to changing circumstances, and de facto
("imperial") power deferred to. Even in the absence of a formal constitution, a
practice does exist of "constitutionalizing" international relations by constant
adjudication between rules and rule-systems, deciding on institutional
powers of international bodies, and formulating legal "principles" out of
scattered materials. The report of the Study Group will thus illustrate the
constitutional mindset at work.
But although the report will show that the law has the resources to deal with
technically novel phenomena and with conflicts between functional regimes,
it will stop short of suggesting how any particular technical or economic
or environmental problem should be resolved. No definite hierarchies will
emerge from the study, only illustrations of how such hierarchies were set
up in the past.38 Even if the law offers a solution to every problem, we cannot
know what that solution is. After all, rules do not spell out the conditions of
their own application.
The result, therefore, could seem insufficient to those hoping to undo
deformalization, fragmentation, or empire through firm hierarchies or
definite policy suggestions. What is the worth of a "constitution" merely
saying that, when problems emerge, it can be used to resolve them, without
specifying how they should be resolved? Is environment more important
than trade? Or vice-versa? Or, in a more policy-oriented vocabulary: why
would anyone wish to allocate the solution of any problem to the "law" if
no one can predict what this means in terms of outcomes, as opposed to
allocating it to a functional regime where the objective will always be the
optimal result from these functions’ perspective?
These questions emerge, however, from a familiar hubris, present in both
textual (formalist) and non-textual (anti-formalist) variants: the assumption
that a right ("lawful," "valid," "optimal," "effective") solution already exists
38 For the first section of the Report, see International Law Commission, Study Group
on the Fragmentation of International Law, Preliminary Report: The Function
and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of Self-Contained regimes,
U.N. Doc. ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1 & Add.1 (May 4, 2004) (prepared by Martti
Koskenniemi, Chairman of the Study Group). The Final Report is now available
as Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.686 13 (Apr. 2006).
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somewhere, and the lawyer’s task is just to find it and apply it. This
hubris is akin to the one Kant detected in early modern natural law, and
indeed in "dogmatism," which used pure reason to capture the (noumenal)
world "without previous criticism of its own powers."39 If there was room
for natural law, as there obviously was, it could only relate to the form in
which reason directs itself toward the external world, not to any content
that it could report to consciousness.40 Knowledge of the law, like any other
knowledge, was not about the facts of an external (textual or natural) reality
but about the application of procedures of reasoning to the available materials,
aiming toward conclusions that had the best chance of impartial, perhaps even
universal, approval.
This shift, from legal materials to examples of the use of legal judgment
in particular cases, will be the principal contribution of the study by
the International Law Commission to the debates on international law’s
fragmentation. It will corroborate the finding in a number of classic studies
on the problem of "gaps in law": even where legal materials run out,
legal reason will continue to operate.41 It is always possible to decide a
case, however intractable, new, or complex it may seem. To account for this
experience, liberal legal theory has developed a number of techniques for
justifying legal decision-making in "hard cases." In particular, it has turned to
the Geistenswissenschaftlich vocabulary of hermeneutics and interpretation,
the justification of juristic decision-making by its aesthetics, the search for
"coherence" or "fit" between the novel case and the legal tradition.42 There is
nothing wrong with this. This is what traditions do: they try to accommodate
new phenomena in patterned, familiar understandings, seeking to balance
reverence for the past with openness to the future, with innovators sometimes
rejected as degraders, sometimes celebrated as regenerators. The task that
deformalization, fragmentation, and empire set before public international
law is nothing more than an invitation to professionals in this field to
apply their public-law oriented "constitutional" mindsets to new technical
39 KANT, supra note 1, at 24.
40 KANT, supra note 2, at 23-24 (Introduction, § B, 6:229-30).
41 See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (2d ed. 1956); see also LUCIAN SIORAT, LE
PROBLE` ME DES LACUNES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1959); ULRICH
FASTENRATH, LU¨ CKEN IM VO¨ LKERRECHT. ZU RECHTSCHARACTER, QUELLEN,
SYSTEMZUSAMMENHANG, METHODENLEHRE UND FUNKTIONEN DES VO¨ LKERRECHTS
(1991) (especially at 213-51).
42 See, in particular, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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problems. This is an invitation to renewal and innovation, no doubt, but
nothing that would be dramatically difficult or even alien.
This response may not satisfy the managerial mindset, however, which
wants to say more, namely, that the very tradition of public international
law is part of the problem and that, no matter how "constitutional mindsets"
deal with novel problems, they will fail to attain the good outcome precisely
because they are "constitutional" and thus limited by their "formalism"
and their "utopian" view of present legal institutions as somehow always
automatically beneficial. In the remainder of this Article, I will try to
articulate the case for the constitutional mindset that is not a priori bound
up with any determinate institution, a mindset building on a tradition
understood from a Kantian perspective as a project of "freedom." The
best way of doing this is to juxtapose this mindset with the ideas of
managerial governance that emerged from the eighteenth century experience
of capitalism, secularisation, and modernity targeted in Kant’s critical
philosophy.
V.
The part of Kant’s lecture from 1780 that I quoted above runs in toto as
follows:
All animals have the faculty of using their powers according to their
will. But this will is not free. It is necessitated through the incitement
of stimuli, and the actions of animals invoke a brute necessitas. If
the will of all beings were so bound to sensuous impulse, the world
would possess no value. The internal value of the world, the summum
bonum, is freedom in accordance with a will that is not necessitated
to action. Freedom is thus the inner value of the world.43
In this Kantian image, the managerial mindset renders human beings as
unfree animals. If I always act strategically in order to realize my interest,
and if my interest is defined in accordance with my pleasure, then there
is really no "I" acting at all, only a replaceable cog in the functional
machine that is indeed the regime of my desires. I am unfree because I
am coerced without being under a legal obligation, that is, without the
43 Cited in GUYER, supra note 4, at 129.
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legal proprium.44 Obligation can attach to a directive only by its imposition
through an authoritative will that may originate in any powerful source. For
freedom to be a reality, however, it must come from within me, and not from
me as a passive navigator between pains and pleasures.45 In order for my will
to be free, I must be able to choose to will in accordance with universal law.
This is the crux of the Kantian formulation of the constitutionalist mindset:
autonomy, and ultimately freedom, can only exist in relation to law conceived
universally.
International lawyers have often been struck by the passage in Perpetual
Peace in which Kant dismisses the natural and international law tradition of
Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel as "leidige Tro¨ster," miserable comforters.46
Kant uses this phrase to argue that law could be built on self-love only at the
cost of collapsing human society into the status of an animal farm. To think of
public power in utility-maximizing terms can neither account for respect for
human beings nor for the emergence of the kingdom of ends. If individuals,
and by extension states, treat each other as instruments of pleasure, as is true
of the rational egoists of natural law or present-day law and economics,47
the result may be an equilibrium that is at best bearable though unlovely,
such as that of the present European Union, in constant danger of slipping
toward the capture of the state by special interests. Kant lacked the critique of
"governmentality" when he was attacking the preceding generation of natural
lawyers, who had been trying to build a political theory on the quintessentially
modern notion of the homo economicus.48 But he saw no less clearly than
Foucault the effects of the turn from sovereignty to the disciplinary power of
economics, technology and science. Is the alternative to scepticism really the
reduction of human beings to functional structure, Leviathan understood as a
calculation machine?
The critique of natural law as a critique of technological reason is certainly
rooted in Europe, and that critique may bring both light and darkness to the
44 Cf. Mary Gregor, Kant on Natural Rights, in KANT AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 50,
52-61 (Ronald Beiner & William James Booth eds., 1993).
45 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40-41
(Mary Gregor ed., Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785) (4:433).
46 KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 103.
47 The character of law & economics as modern natural law is discussed in BENOIˆT
FRYDMAN & GUY HAARSCHER, PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 67-97 (1998).
48 MICHEL FOUCAULT, NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE: COURS AU COLLEGE DE FRANCE
1978-1979, at 271-329 (2004). Foucault listed Kant among those who participated
in this by canvassing a teleological "plan of nature" that would bring about world
unity (under European leadership) by the creation of global markets though global
law. Id. at 57-60.
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world, as Europeans know only too well. Kant’s "Copernican revolution"
may have contributed to the release of some breaks that, had they been
in place, might have lessened the scale of twentieth-century European
catastrophes. But (pace Foucault) Kant is innocent of Europe’s later moral
failures. His notion of freedom, which belongs to the original Enlightenment
project seeking to liberate human beings from their self-imposed immaturity,
remains as valid now as it was two-hundred years ago. From that perspective,
strategic action, game theory, and the balancing of stakeholder claims in
order to reach the Pareto optimum will always involve a Faustian pact.
Costs and benefits can never be calculated so as to take into account the
transaction costs of turning to calculation in the first place, namely, the cost
of freedom.
But what is "freedom"? No doubt, reference to the freedom-enhancing
quality of the law is an offshoot of eighteenth-century rationalism, which
is highly vulnerable to critique. For instance, according to standard liberal
theory, the rule of law is supposed to safeguard freedom by binding public
officials to predictable forms of behavior so that individuals may plan their
lives as they wish.49 But if the critique of legal indeterminacy is right, that
is, if legal rules do not spell out the conditions of their application, there is no
guarantee of predictability or, where predictability does exist, no guarantee
that it would not result from political bias rather than from the law. Of course,
patterns do emerge and institutional behavior does become predictable, and
this is celebrated under the ideology of the rule of law.50 And yet, as critics
note, mere uniformity is not per se beneficial or, at least, not necessarily more
beneficial than the rule of an enlightened, if capricious, prince.
An alternative could be offered to Kant’s explanation of the freedom-
enhancing nature of the law. If freedom means individual autonomy and
self-determination, namely, recognizing only the authority of one’s own will,
there must be a technique for communicating that will between individuals
on the one hand, and between individuals and the public power on the
other. Law is needed for legislation to exist, and legislation is needed
for self-determination to be possible. Law’s virtue does not lie only in
law-application. It resides equally in legislation as the expression of a
community’s self-determining will. It was not for nothing that what Kant
celebrated in the French Revolution was precisely the way it expounded
49 E.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) (especially at 133).
50 For a general overview, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
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"the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that
it sees fit, without interference from other powers."51
The predictability or stability brought by law is not what made Kant a
legalist. Clearly, the ancien re´gime had been stable and had acted predictably
for a long, indeed too long a time. It may have acted arbitrarily too, but
that was not the main problem. The problem was its consistent reliance
on social hierarchy, and the suppression of freedom from the bulk of the
population. This is why the first article of the project on perpetual peace
called for the establishment of republican (i.e. representative) government.52
And this is what resonates in the current experience of globalization, and in the
sense in which fragmentation, deformalization, and empire seem to undermine
individual autonomy and communal self-determination. In fragmentation,
law emerges from expert-guided "regimes"; in deformalization, it transforms
into administrative compromises between powerful stakeholder groups, and
in "empire," it collapses into domination. The worry about new global law
reflects concerns about the absence of structures of political representation,
contestation, and accountability, of a public sphere institutionally linked
to global power. The present concern about freedom spells worries about
autonomy, understood as self-legislation. Whatever the managerial mindset
has to say about the difficulties of effective governance today fails to address
the sense that these difficulties are undermining freedom, in the sense of
leading one’s life only under the authority of one’s own (good) will.
To be sure, the vocabulary of freedom has enjoyed an ambivalent career
on both sides of the Atlantic. The complexity of the Kantian, or perhaps the
German, idea53 of freedom as fidelity to the law may appear as an invitation
to authoritarianism.54 It is interesting to see how French inter-war social and
legal thought, for example, derived German aggression from Kant, sometimes
even from Luther, without worrying too much about fine distinctions.55 From
this perspective, the freedom promised by the Enlightenment was always too
heavy. As actual individuals collapsed under its weight, they became easy
material for uncritical co-option into whatever collective romance was being
51 IMMANUEL KANT, The Contest of Faculties, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 3,
at 182.
52 KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 99-102.
53 LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
TRADITION (1957).
54 As suggested, for example, in MARTIN WIGHT, Foreword to FOUR SEMINAL
THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY 67-71 (Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter ed.,
2005).
55 See, e.g., LOUIS LE FUR, GUERRE JUSTE ET JUSTE PAIX 29-38 (1920).
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offered instead. Thanks to Kant, these critics were saying, that co-option could
always be described in terms of (positive) freedom.
In the New World, freedom was a more straightforward notion. Even
to think of the state as the fullest realisation of freedom, as Kant and
other Europeans did (and still do), was the epitome of confused, dangerous
dogma.56 True, it may be nice to have clean parks and public spaces, with
unbroken benches and without a beer ad blocking the view of the lake. But
these are no match, politically speaking, to the freedom to drink beer, or to sell
it, and then if a drunk but free individual throws the bench into the lake, why
would you mind? If in Europe, freedom was devoured by law, in the United
States, freedom tends to devour itself.
How so? Again, through hubris, such as the hubris of "infinite freedom"
for the Iraqis. But freedom cannot be "infinite."57 This is the wish to eat
an infinite number of hamburgers without being disturbed by the awareness
of what it will do to your physical constitution. Political freedom untainted
by knowledge turns power into an apparently unending source of instant
gratification with tragedy looming just around the corner. In the early spring
of 2003, I was in New York following the march to war when an "expert"
explained on Fox TV that U.S. soldiers should behave with dignity when
Iraqi women throw candy at their feet, since this is the traditional Iraqi way
of greeting liberators. The prospect of being seen as "heroes" must have so
warmed the hearts of the audience that it stunned the mind against everything
we know or may suspect of other societies.
There would be no candy. Instead, the "illegality" of the war would become
a key point in the worldwide opposition to it. Why? Because although it
was carried out in the name of "freedom," it violated the key (Kantian)
sense of freedom as self-determination and autonomy.58 The special scandal
of the war did not lie in the fact that its justifications turned out to be lies
and that, even if they had been true, they might not have made a persuasive
case for war. The scandal was the cynical manner in which the process to
war brushed aside any need to treat other people as free, autonomous, and
deserving an equal hearing in the common vocabulary of the law of peace
under the United Nations Charter. An arrogant act of imperial hubris, it could
only lead to unfreedom.
56 Which is why so many liberal Kantians today oppose the State.
57 As pointed out in TERRY EAGLETON, HOLY TERROR 68-88 (2005).
58 I have treated the "special scandal" of the Iraqi war and the universalism in
response of the civil society at greater length in Martti Koskenniemi, What Should
International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 229, 242-246
(2004).
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The war propaganda spoke about bringing happiness to Iraq. But Kant,
of course, held that moral law could not be based on a (Hobbesian) search
of happiness, for it could then not be universal.59 People derive happiness
from different sources and we have no automatic access to the happiness
of others; indeed, to presume we have violates their autonomy. This was
certainly one of the bases for Kant’s view that morality pronounced an absolute
veto on war and, more specifically, his view that one of the "Preliminary
Articles on Perpetual Peace" should read: "No state shall forcibly interfere
in the constitution and government of another state."60 The Kantian notion
of freedom was developed with vivid awareness of the limitations that an
external cognitive, political, and moral world impose on freedom. The point
of the critique of pure reason was precisely to undermine hubris, to outline the
respective jurisdictions of reason and faith by producing their coterminous
limit. Freedom was what was not limited by what we can know and, as Kant
never tires of reminding us, first of all we should know. Sapere aude! This was
not just a practical instruction for scientists, but a moral principle applicable
to all.
But Kantian freedom is also limited by the moral law. Indeed, it is an effect
of that law. Freedom unrestrained by the moral law sees no obstacle, for
instance, to legislation allowing torture, as long as instrumental justification
can be adduced: the bomb is ticking and torture might save lives. For a
Kantian, practices of torture are the moral equivalent of eating too many
hamburgers; the one corrupts the soul just as surely as the other destroys
the body, which of course appears to prove the very point the managerial
mindset always makes: you are an unredeemed metaphysician! Not to
torture, it suggests, is irresponsible: how many innocent must be sacrificed
to the moral absolutism of some?
No doubt, absolutists can be reduced to moral relativism through scenarios
of ticking bombs and raped mothers. In fact, it is just as simple to turn
relativists into absolutists by pointing out that, when the time of decision
comes, one scale of values, out of all the alternatives still available a
moment before, must be vindicated at the exclusion of others. Absolutism
and relativism, principles and calculations, are positions impossible to sustain
for any length of time. Kantian lawyers may have tended to err on the side
of absolutism, but this becomes pathological only if they simultaneously fail
to take seriously the antinomy of law and of judgment and believe that their
59 KANT, supra note 45, at 8-9, 19-20 (on the limits of understanding to grasp what
brings "happiness"); KANT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
60 KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 96.
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(proper) constitutional rigorism prevents them from a close analysis of the
particular cases they have to judge.
VI.
"All right," says the expert, "so you say the law comes first, and only
through the law can we be free. But you have also said, correctly, that
‘the law does not spell out the conditions of its own application.’ And still
you seek commitment to institutions and legal forms. Why? If the law is
indeterminate, then surely you should simply turn to the consequences of
alternative choices, analyze the costs and benefits, and then decide. To tie
yourself to the form of the legal is to remain bound by pre-modern mystique;
under the cover of constitutionalism, you are led into decisionism. Behind
the figure of Hans Kelsen lurks the shadow of Carl Schmitt."
Neither Kant nor Kelsen are concerned with legal hermeneutics, and this
may seem strange. For Kelsen, determining the content of the legal norm was
a political question, a view that mainstream liberal theory has consistently
seen as one the main weaknesses of the pure theory of law, however
much Kelsen may have thought of his formalism as a political project.61 To
locate the power of his project, which I see as an effort to institutionalize a
constitutional mindset to contest the use of power, we must first sketch what
it had targeted.
In Weimar jurisprudence, two types of managerial mindset competed for
state power. One saw the state as an instrument for bargaining between
special interests, a calculating machine enabling different social groups to
divide available resources between them. Another saw the state per se as
representing an ethos or a founding principle (nomos) that the state was
meant to realize. State law was about something beyond itself, as well as
an instrument for managing state power to fulfil these external objectives or
functions. For Kelsen (or indeed for Kant), the task was to construe a "strong
state," able to resist these two threats without becoming an "authoritarian
state."
61 See JOCHEN VON BERNSTORFF, DER GLAUBE AN DAS UNIVERSALE RECHT: ZUR
VO¨ LKERRECHTSTHEORIE HANS KELSENS UND SEINER SCHU¨ LER (2001). The story of
the political weakness of Kelsen’s "pure theory" is well told in DAVID DYZENHAUS,
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER
IN WEIMAR (1997) (especially at 157-60); see also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-
1960, at 238-49 (2001).
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Rational choice, strategic action, and the search for "compliance" in
international relations departments and law schools pose similar types of
"realist" challenges to international law: to articulate the concerns of the
new managerial classes on the one hand, and to streamline the imperial
machine on the other. They describe a world of political conflicts over
resources, rights, and conditions for spiritual and material well-being as a
world of technical management problems. Where law enables contestants for
resources to express their claims in terms of rights and of the accountability
of public officials, managerialism sees only private interests poised against
one another, suggesting that all the regime needs is even more fine-tuning
by better expert analysis.
Like the expert on Fox TV, these new realists, in their hubris, believe in
the power of their predictive and explanatory matrices and think that words
such as "power," "bargain," "costs and benefits," or "legitimacy" mark out
entities in the empirical world that would automatically guide policy. But
since expert systems are no less indeterminate than law, this move only
institutionalizes an anti-political, technical mindset that, under the cover of
seeking effectiveness, looks no further than the next internal audit and the
prospects for the next promotion: my success as the criterion of the world’s
happiness.
In the Appendix to Perpetual Peace, his eyes firmly fixed on France,
the end of Terror, and the establishment of the Thermidorean constitution,
Kant makes a distinction between the "political moralist" and the "moral
politician."62 The former, he writes "makes the principles subordinate to the
end."63 These ends have no independence from the ends of some people,
namely, those managing the regimes and their academic advisers. Kant
would stress the degree to which political moralists are enchanted by the
force of their soi-disant "realism," their prudential vocabulary of power that
always enables them to find a strategic consideration to justify putting other
people into harm’s way, thus "placing man into the same class as other
living machines, which only need to realise consciously that they are not
free beings for them to become, in their own eyes, the most wretched of all
earthy creatures."64
Having outlined the moral necessity of shifting relationships between
nations from the state of nature to a federation that would secure freedom
62 For this link, see ANDRE TOSEL, KANT REVOLUTIONNAIRE: DROIT ET POLITIQUE
19-21 (1990).
63 KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 118-21.
64 Id. at 123.
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for all of them, and having insisted that states must "adapt themselves to
public coercive laws,"65 Kant says nothing about how or by whom those laws
should be administered, either in Perpetual Peace or in his Rechtslehre a few
years later. He only discusses the "moral politician," who focuses on how
to treat others as ends and not as means, that is, relinquishing the utilitarian
vocabulary of early natural law that was the apology for absolutism. Kant, of
course, did not think that fidelity to the law meant fidelity to any particular
substance but irrespective of such substance; on the other hand, since he
leaves the determination of substance to the judgment of the law-applier, he
also liberated the latter to construe the meaning of the law to be applied.
Kant probably refrained from proposing a legal hermeneutics because
it could have no power to bind law-appliers, whose moral duty is to
judge for themselves what the principles of universality and freedom might
require in a real world of conflict and contestation. Kant has nothing to say
about technical lawyers, apart from dismissing some of them as "miserable
comforters." But he has much to say about "moral politicians," whose task it
would be to administer the federal pact so that, in due course, it would lead
to perpetual peace. Moral politics and legal practice cannot be separated.
Law is simply the name for the external institutions that administer what is
a moral-political project.66
VII.
Thinking of constitutionalism as a mindset instead of as architecture implies
a kind of Copernican turn in legal theory. Mere constitutional architectonics,
as Kelsen was to experience personally, provides a poor guarantee for
freedom. Whereas early modern natural lawyers thought of constitutions
as mechanisms of control and of constitutional debates as discourses of
power, Kant sought to articulate their historical specificity against such
"dogmatisms." What was the difference between the French revolutionaries
and the representatives of the ancien re´gime? What was the significance of a
people in 1789 giving "itself a civil constitution of the kind it sees fit" instead
65 Id. at 105.
66 The view of Kant as seeking internal moral regeneration, and thus prolonging the
tradition of school metaphysics against the externally oriented civil philosophy
of Pufendorf and Thomasius, is discussed rather interestingly, even if perhaps
one-sidedly (there are practically no references to Kant’s openly political writings)
in IAN HUNTER, RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY
IN EARLY MODERN GERMANY 274-376 (2001).
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of receiving one from a benevolent tyrant? Surely the difference between
the Revolution and the counter-revolution was not exhausted by the fact
that one was successful and the other was not. The Revolution was proof
that the human race was "constantly progressing."67 Even if constitutions
and bills of right are indeed the result of struggles for hegemony, and even as
their meaning cannot be separated from the meaning they have for particular
readers and interpreters, the French Revolution and with it the idea of a people
giving itself a constitution was evidence of a historical break that could be
articulated in two types of critical attitude to law and in two politics of law.68
One unfolds within the act of judgment located in the institutional
process of applying the law in one way rather than another. Kant has this
moment in mind when, in the midst of the Revolution, he endorses the
mindset of the moral politician, the actor conscious that the right judgment
cannot be reduced to the use of instrumental reason and who, in judging,
aims to act as a "genuine republican" encompassing the perspective of the
whole.69 As is well-known, Kant’s political theory is complemented by his
analysis of the faculty of imagination operative in aesthetic judgment.70 The
aesthetic judgment, which is neither rationally subsumed under a rule nor a
fully subjective expression of emotion, captures also the plight of the moral
politician as law-applier. Although the way the moral politician approaches
a particular situation is undetermined by any rule (a matter of "reflective"
instead of "determinative" judgment in Kant’s aesthetic vocabulary), it still
claims general assent. No wonder that aesthetics, "coherence," has become
the focus of modern liberal-constitutional theories of judging.71 In both, one
is called upon to visualize oneself in everyone else’s place. To say "this
painting is beautiful" is not only about what one feels about it. This statement
seeks more general validity, just as the claim of adopting a constitution sought
validity beyond the immediate concerns of the Revolution, and just as the legal
judgment claiming "this is valid law" is different from the statements "this is
good" or "this is useful." This is also how that claim was understood by Kant
67 See, in particular, KANT, supra note 51, at 182-85.
68 Kant viewed the human species as consisting of adolescents and, until the Revolution,
had few positive things to say about it.
69 See KANT, Perpetual Peace, supra note 3, at 116-25 (especially at 122).
70 KANT, supra note 5. For the suggestion that the Third Critique forms the core of Kant’s
political theory, see especially HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (Ronald Beiner ed., 1982). But see FRANCOISE PROUST, KANT ET LE TON
DE L’HISTOIRE (1991); ALAIN RENAUT, KANT AUJOURD’HUI 405-15 (1997).
71 The paradigm here is Ronald Dworkin’s legal theory. For a brief overview of liberal
theories of judging, see KENNEDY, supra note 26, at 97-130.
2006] Constitutionalism as Mindset 33
and other observers, and what set the paradigm of (Kantian) constitutionalism:
the search for validity beyond the inclinations of the speaker.
Liberal jurisprudence has tried to articulate rules for the use of
that imagination and for the de-centering of the self in a series of
hermeneutical techniques, but Kant suggests something different: to expand
toward universality, one must penetrate deeper into subjectivity, law as a
crystallization of personal virtue rather than in opposition to it. The world
federation should, after all, be ruled by moral politicians! This suggestion
cannot be detached from the results of the critical project that, by the
onset of the Revolution, had completely destabilized the hubris of having
full knowledge of the natural world or of the related naturalist idea of
politics as a technology for governing human beings. If the principles
of the Rechtslehre remained principles of (rational) natural law, it was
at such a high level of abstraction that they could not free lawyers (as
"moral politicians") from having to think for themselves. The Pietist
search for self-improvement, Bildung, and spiritual perfection prepares
a constitutionalist mindset from which to judge the world in a manner that
aims for universality, impartiality, and all the virtues of the "inner morality
of law": honesty, fairness, concern for others, the prohibition of deceit,
injury, and coercion.72 Though this is a vocabulary of moral regeneration, it
is also the vocabulary of constitutionalism.
Liberal hermeneutics provides one approach to the contemplative,
somewhat outer-worldly search for the independence and impartiality needed
to carry out the work of judgment so as to use power in a responsible way. The
"moral politician" participates in a modern priesthood that accepts Weber’s
"calling," somewhat resembling the heroes that Weber and the classical
realists had in mind when illustrating the virtues of statesmanship. Those
virtues were irreducible to instrumental calculations or to the applications
of principle. Giving up the dogmatic illusion of total control, they framed
the responsible political choice as a judgment in contingency, perhaps
somewhat akin to the way Florentine political theory once proposed that
"the problem of fortune is a problem of virtue."73 If the critical project has
one political consequence, it is pointing to the limits of the power of cognitive
72 For an alternative formulation of this "inner morality," see LON FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1964); see, e.g., J.B. Schneewind, Autonomy, Obligation
and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO KANT 309, 320-21 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992); ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS
OF JUSTICE 65-79 passim (2000).
73 JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 157 (1975); see
generally id. at 156-82. This is also suggested in R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE:
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vocabularies and to the irreducibility of a (free) decision to any (natural or
rational) structure.
But constitutional vocabularies do not merely frame the internal world
of "moral politicians" conscious of the contingency of their choices.
They inform political struggles. Instrumental vocabularies are mastered
by technical and administrative bodies and articulate concerns they tend
to consider important. By contrast, such constitutional vocabularies as
"self-determination," "fundamental rights," "division and accountability of
power," and so forth, with all their historical thickness, contest the structural
biases of present institutions and politicize what otherwise appears as
routine administration. The Revolution was not just another development
on the stage of European politics. It questioned the stage itself. This
was the very point of its constitutional rhetoric: to destabilize dynastic
administration (as technology). Hence Kant’s extraordinary optimism.74
From then on, even as there may be temporary reversals, what had taken place
"can never be forgotten since it has revealed in human nature an aptitude
and power of improvement of a kind which no politician could have
thought up by examining the course of events in the past."75 In 1798, Kant
celebrated the spontaneous and disinterested enthusiasm of the observers of
the French Revolution. He opposed Prussia’s counter-revolutionary attacks
against France as attacks against freedom. Though moral regeneration was
certainly on Kant’s agenda, it did not exhaust his political program. Mere
instruction at schools on order to make young people good citizens was "a plan
which is scarcely likely tohave thedesiredsuccess."76 Instead,Kantendorseda
republican citizenship that highlighted active political participation to reform
the state too, with a view of "continuous progress" toward the desired goal of
a "universal association of states" in which freedom might become a reality.77
What is important here is not so much the realism of Kant’s prognosis of
"perpetual peace" or choosing between the many forms of international order
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 36, 38-47 (1993). To associate
Kant with Machiavelli seems initially odd. The ideal of the "moral politician" seems
the antithesis of the separation between private and public morality underlying
Machiavellian virtu`. Nevertheless, both stress the way the individual judgment (in
contrast to the character on which it is based) remains irreducible to rule-following.
74 The contrast between Kant’s 1784 Essay and his later writings during the revolution
is highlighted in Alexis Philonenko, De la de´mocratie chez Kant et Fichte, 2
PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE 53, 56-57 (1992).
75 KANT, supra note 51, at 184.
76 Id. at 189.
77 See, e.g., KANT, supra note 2, at 119 (§ 61). See also TOSEL, supra note 62, at
94-99.
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he projected, or even the strength of the public realm as a forum for political
contestation. Rather, what is important is the use of the constitutional
vocabulary to express a fundamental critique of present politics. The ancien
re´gime existed for the privilege of particular estates; the Revolution, as
Sieye`s put it, upheld the rights of the "universal estate."78 For Kant as for
other sympathizers, the historical meaning of the French Revolution was the
entry into politics of the regulative idea of universality. As the revolutionaries
claimed, and as observers indeed understood, the Revolution was not one more
episode in the traditional ebb and flow of dynastic struggles. A qualitatively
novel form of political order was being created that set as its horizon the
liberation of humanity itself.79 This effect, this aesthetic effect, was brought
about by the language of constitutionalism. The extreme inequality of a
society of estates was articulated and attacked by the vocabulary of the rule
of law.
The virtue of constitutionalism in the international world follows from
a similar universalizing focus, allowing extreme inequality in the world to
be not only shown but also condemned. This inequality may be explained
by historical causes and described in economic or sociological terms. But
something like a constitutional vocabulary is needed to articulate it as a
scandal insofar as it violates the equal dignity and autonomy of human
beings. It can be used to show that the suffering created by an international
intellectual property regime, for example, or an imperial war in the Middle
East, is more than private suffering, that these choices violate more than
the interests or benefits of their immediate victims, and that the scandals
emerging from them are not calculable as "costs" to be offset by future
"benefits." The use of the constitutional vocabulary, like Kant’s aesthetic
judgment, transforms individual suffering into an objective wrong that
concerns not just the victim, but everyone. If calculation is needed, then
"all" must be counted as the cost.
Dying of malaria when the available technical and economic resources
are sufficient to prevent this, or suffering torture in a hidden detention camp,
are not just unfortunate historical events touching only the physical persons
concerned. In a secular society, it is the political business of constitutionalism
to endow such events with sacredness or with a symbolic meaning
78 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, QU’EST-CE QUE LE TIERS-E´ TAT? (Arno Press 1979)
(1789).
79 For the extent to which Kant saw the Revolution as an exception to normal politics
(that justifed relaxing even many of his otherwise absolute principles), see Jacques
d’Hondt, Kant et la Re´volution francaise, 2 PHILOSOPHIE POLITIQUE 39, 46-51
(1992).
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that lifts them beyond their individuality. They work as "archetypes,"80
or normative moorings for political identity, without which expert systems
could not be distinguished from crack parties, and calculations of costs and
benefits might as well be carried out by lottery. It may be unfortunate that
international relations lack a more robust constitutional tradition, and recent
constitutionalist writings are disappointing in their nostalgic attachment to
traditional diplomatic institutions. One thing that lawyers may perhaps learn
from the constitutional failure in the EU last year is that constitutional
politics is resistant, indeed opposed, to managerialism. It cannot survive
as an instrumental project. In a fundamentally unfree and unequal world,
constitutionalism, as Kant might have put it, carries the ideal of a free and
self-determining humanity.
80 The suggestion of the significance of the "absolute" prohibition of torture as
"archetype" is from Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for
the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005).
